Political cycles in a small open economy and the effect of economic integration: evidence from Cyprus by Efthyvoulou, Georgios
ISSN 1745-8587 
B
irk
be
ck
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s 
in
 E
co
no
m
ic
s 
&
 F
in
an
ce
 
 
 
School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics 
 
 
 
 
BWPEF 0808 
 
 
 
Political Cycles in a Small Open 
Economy and the Effect of Economic 
Integration: Evidence from Cyprus 
 
 
Georgios Efthyvoulou 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2008 
▪ Birkbeck, University of London ▪ Malet Street ▪ London ▪ WC1E 7HX ▪ 
Political Cycles in a Small Open Economy
and the Effect of Economic Integration:
Evidence from Cyprus
Georgios Efthyvoulou∗
December 2008
Abstract
This paper examines whether partisan politics and opportunistic government
behavior generate political cycles in a small open economy, and, if so, whether such
effects survive under increased economic integration. We discuss evidence drawn
from Cyprus for the period 1978-2006. The empirical analysis extends the work of
Alesina et al. (1997) to accommodate the special features of the Cypriot economy
in a controlled environment era and follows a more technical econometric approach
to ensure that our estimations will not draw misleading inferences. The results
are in line with the rational partisan model and are similar to the ones obtained
for other countries. On the other hand, the findings for Cyprus support also the
existence of an electoral cycle in fiscal policy and reject the one in monetary pol-
icy. We argue that the unique politico-economic profile of a country is crucial for
the empirical success of different theories. Furthermore, we find that the reported
effects do not persist in the run-up to EU accession and ERM II participation. The
implementation of several structural reforms and the Maastricht criteria seem to
affect governments’ ability to influence the domestic economy.
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1
21 Introduction
One of the most fundamental questions in the field of political economy is the inter-
play between the political environment and economic performance. Over the last three
decades economists have paid a great deal of attention to exploring macroeconomic
fluctuations as an interaction between market forces and government behavior, leading
to political cycles theories. These theories fall into two broad categories: the “oppor-
tunistic” and the “partisan”. The former claim that all governments propose the same
platform to voters and choose policies to maximize their popularity and, therefore, their
chance of being reelected. The latter assume that government preferences differ over
policies and argue that the economy is influenced by the ideological orientation and
philosophy of the party in office.
There is an extensive empirical literature on how the political process influences
the economies of several industrial countries. However, empirical studies that focus
exclusively on small open economies are relatively rare. An enquiry in this direction
may reveal that when the economy is very sensitive to external economic and political
factors, governments feel particularly constrained in pursuing their political targets and
hence, political cycles are less pronounced. Lindbeck (1976) notes that under the “small
country assumption” the room for national stabilization policy is limited while Alesina
et al. (1997) stress that politicians’ goals in small open economies are likely to be
defined in relation to the rest of the world. The present paper tests these hypotheses
empirically using data drawn from Cyprus, one of the smallest countries in Europe
with extensive trade and financial linkages throughout the region1. This paper also
investigates whether the process of joining the European Union (EU) and the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM II) has reduced the dimension of partisan and electoral effects
observed in Cyprus. A positive answer to the latter question would lend support to
the view that politics will not be that important for macroeconomic policies inside
the European Monetary Union (EMU), and more generally, that political cycles will
be mitigated in the future. The design of our empirical analysis builds on the work
of Alesina et al. (1997). However, in order to ensure that our estimated results will
not draw misleading inferences, we adopt a more technical econometric approach and
perform several robustness tests capturing the unique features of the Cypriot economy
in a controlled environment era.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, political con-
siderations tend to influence the determination of economic outcomes and the choice
of policy instrument in Cyprus, despite the smallness and openness of its economy. In
particular, we find that, during the period 1978-2003, partisanship plays the role par-
tisan theory predicts and its impact is consistent with the overall pattern of evidence
for other countries (see Alesina et al. , 1997). On the other hand, the analysis for
Cyprus, unlike the one for other countries, validates the hypothesis of opportunistic
motivations in fiscal policy and fails to detect electoral cycles in monetary policy. The
unique politico-economic profile of Cyprus, coupled with the fact that different admin-
1Cyprus has an open, free-market, service-based economy and it is classified amongst the advanced
economies of the world by the International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, 2007). The
World Bank in its July 2002 list of economies classifies Cyprus as a high income country - it holds
the 16th place worldwide in terms of per capital income. During the period 1981-1997, the average
growth rate of the economy was about 5.4%, which compares very favorably with growth rates in other
developed and developing countries during the same period (Temple, 1997). During the period 2002-
2007, the average growth rate was about 3.8%, while inflation stood at 2.9% and unemployment at
3.4% (Statistical Service of Cyprus Report, 2007). On May, 2004, Cyprus became a full member of the
European Union and from January 2008, the country entered the Eurozone and adopted the euro.
3istrations use different instruments to achieve the same goals, seems to be responsible
for the aforementioned results. Second, political cycles in Cyprus appear to be less
systematic in the post-2003 period, implying that politics become less important as a
country moves towards greater economic integration with EMU members.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 provides a brief overview of political
cycles’ literature. Section 2 describes the data, sources and variables used. Section
3 presents the econometric techniques applied and the specification of the empirical
tests. Section 4 investigates whether the cyclical movements of economic outcomes
are systematically affected by partisan and opportunistic considerations in the case of
Cyprus. Section 5 follows the same procedure as in Section 4 to test for the presence
of political cycles in macroeconomic policy instruments. Section 6 discusses the results
obtained and addresses some directions of future research.
1.1 Theoretical and Empirical Overview
The opportunistic model in its traditional form was firstly developed by Nordhaus (1975)
and Lindbeck (1976) and is underlined by the Phillips curve trade-off and voters’ naivety
and myopia. It predicts that the politically determined policy choice will result in a
“political business cycle”: output growth above normal, unemployment below normal
and a moderate increase in inflation before elections, and a more substantial increase
in inflation after the election, which is soon reduced with a recession. Voters, whose
electoral choice is sensitive to macroeconomic variables, respond positively and reward
this behavior, not recognizing that after the election inflation will rise while output and
employment will return to their natural rates.
A second phase of the literature on opportunistic models took off after the rational
expectations revolution of the seventies. Several authors propose models that incor-
porate voters’ rationality into the governments’ opportunistic behavior and argue that
electoral cycles in certain macroeconomic variables derive from temporary information
asymmetries. More precisely, they assume that the government observes an indicator of
its “competence” before the representative voter does and, therefore, it tries to signal
that it is doing well prior to election periods. Cukierman & Meltzer (1986) define com-
petence as the ability to forecast the performance of the economy and show that most
governments use discretionary policy to increase the probability of reelection leading
to socially suboptimal choices of policy instruments. Rogoff & Sibert (1988) measure
competence as the ability to administer the public goods production process (finance
the required amount of spending with a smaller amount of revenues) and present a
political cycle in fiscal policy - labeled political budget cycle. Their model predicts
that in the preelectoral period, taxation is below the efficient level and inflation above
optimal. Rogoff (1990) considers a similar model and suggests that governments tend
to bias preelection fiscal policy towards easily observed consumption expenditures and
away from investment projects. Finally, Persson & Tabellini (1990) modify the Phillips
curve equation by adding a competence term, defined as the ability to increase output
growth without inflation. Their model generates a political business cycle but not in the
form of the traditional Nordhaus-Lindbeck model, in the sense that it does not predict
a postelectoral recession after the preelectoral boom.
The partisan model in its traditional form was originally proposed by Hibbs (1977)
following an empirical analysis of aggregate data in several countries. It argues that gov-
ernments pursue macroeconomic policies according to the objective economic interests
and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political constituencies. In other
words, left-wing governments are more concerned with unemployment and growth and
4relatively less with inflation while right-wing parties have opposite preferences.
Alesina (1987) approaches Hibbs’s partisan model relying on rational voting behav-
ior and uses a wage-contract interpretation of the Phillips curve. The prediction of his
model involves transitory, rather than persistent, differences in real economic outcomes.
Specifically, Alesina (1987) shows that the output effects associated with a government
change toward the left derive from the surprise inflation; a new government will increase
the rate of growth of the money supply leading to a higher inflation and, for a given real
interest rate, to a higher nominal interest rate, a transitory reduction in real wages and
an output increase. This output stimulus will persist as long as the wage adjustment
process is subject to inertia because of staggered or overlapping labor contracts. Con-
sequently, one should observe recessions in the first part of right-wing administrations,
as compared with higher output growth and inflation in the first part of left-wing ad-
ministrations. In the second part, output growth should return to its natural level for
both types and inflation should remain higher during a left-wing administration.
The empirical implications of these four types of models (see Table A.2.1 and Ta-
ble A.2.2 on page 34) have been tested by Alesina and several co-authors on data for
the United States and other OECD countries, confirming their predecessors’ conclusions.
Generally speaking, the partisan models based on rational choice and expectations are
empirically more successful than the partisan models in their traditional form. More-
over, the partisan models perform better than the opportunistic ones in explaining
macroeconomic fluctuations in output growth and unemployment. The findings on op-
portunistic effects are limited to short-run and occasional manipulations of inflation and
certain policy instruments before elections. In other words, the evidence reinforces the
rational partisan theory of Alesina (1987), rejects Nordhaus-Lindbeck’s political busi-
ness cycle and fails to reject the rational opportunistic models of Rogoff & Sibert (1988)
and Rogoff (1990) for several countries. With the recent advance in European economic
integration, the empirical literature has started to investigate different situations where
countries are highly economically interdependent and turned its attention to political
effects on fiscal policy. However, the results obtained from these studies are relatively
mixed (for more details see Section 5.2. on Fiscal Policy).
2 Data
We consider Cyprus macroeconomic time series for the period 1978-20062. The variables
are extracted from several data sources in Cyprus (the Statistical Service of Cyprus, the
Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of Cyprus, the Press and Information Office
and the Economics Research Center) and the databases of IMF-IFS and Eurostat. The
economic data consists of quarterly observations on economic outcomes (output growth
rates, unemployment rates and inflation rates), quarterly observations on representative
instruments of monetary policy (growth rates of monetary aggregates - M1 and M2 -
and short term interest rates - three month treasury bill rates and retail bank lending
rates) and yearly observations on fiscal policy measures (budget deficits and changes in
the components of the fiscal balance). Note that all economic series for which we have
quarterly observations are seasonally adjusted using the X12 ARIMA method of the
US Census Bereau3. Moreover, in order to remove the strong seasonal persistence in
2We use the post-1978 period for two reasons. First, during the years 1976-1980 the production in
Cyprus reached its pre-invasion level soon after the Turkish invasion of 1974 (Pashardes & Hajispyrou,
2003) and second, half of the political parties being considered for this analysis were founded in 1976
and therefore, the presidential elections of 1978 were the first ones under the current partisan structure.
3The interest rates are not seasonally adjusted since the seasonality hypothesis is rejected.
5growth rates, we take the seasonal difference of natural logarithms4. The time span is
determined by the availability of observations (see Table A.2.3 on page 35). The political
data include presidential election dates5 and the government’s political orientation6.
The government can be defined as right, left or centrist according to which party holds
the presidency. In the case that more than one party form the government, the coalition
can be described as either center-right or center-left. Finally, when the president appears
to be without a clear political orientation - not a member of a particular party - the
government is classified according to the parties that nominate or support the president7
(see Table A.2.4 on page 35).
3 Econometric Methodology
Following the empirical analysis of Alesina et al. (1997), we test the various theories
of political cycles by running regressions of time-series data including political variables
among the regressors. Alesina et al. (1997) rely on the assumption that all macroeco-
nomic variables are generated by a covariance-stationary stochastic process that can be
expressed in autoregressive form but they do not apply any modern techniques to con-
firm its validity. Recently, the importance of using the most appropriate specification for
modeling the deterministic component of an economic time series has been emphasized
(see Enders, 2003). Moreover, the stationarity in macroeconomic time series is a vital
issue since misspecification of a random walk as a stationary process evolving around
a deterministic trend has major effects on the statistical analysis of the data (Maddala
& Kim, 1998). Therefore, in order to ensure that our estimated results will not draw
misleading inferences, we firstly examine the stability of the series by applying unit
root tests, both in the absence and in the presence of structural breaks, and secondly
use the Box-Jenkins modeling procedure and ARCH techniques to model the stationary
component of each regression equation and the variance of the error component (see
Appendix A.1 for relevant theory). Hence, the econometric methodology in this paper
is divided in three parts: (i) unit root analysis, (ii) model selection and (iii) specification
of empirical tests on political cycles. Note that for the time being we focus on the three
economic outcomes and the four monetary policy instruments, as defined in Section 2,
for which we have quarterly observations. Also note that, since the econometric analysis
provides nearly the same results for the two short term interest rates, we present the
results on the treasury bill rates only.
4The output growth rate in quarter t is defined as the yearly rate of change of real gross domestic
product (RGDP), i.e. yt = (lnRGDPt − lnRGDPt−4) × 100, the inflation rate as the yearly rate
of change of consumer price index (CPI), i.e. pit = (lnCPIt − lnCPIt−4) × 100, and the money
growth rates as the yearly rate of change of M1 and M2, i.e. m1t = (lnM1t − lnM1t−4) × 100 and
m2t = (lnM2t − lnM2t−4)× 100, respectively.
5The president of Cyprus is elected for a five year term directly by the people. The president is
both head of state and head of government, and of a pluriform multi-party system. Executive power is
exercised by the government. Federal legislative power is vested in both the government and the House
of Representatives.
6For this definition we take into account the four strong parties that generally dominate the political
landscape in Cyprus: AKEL: Progressive Party of Working People (left), DISY: Democratic Rally
(right), DIKO: Democratic Party (centrist) and EDEK: United Democratic Union of Center (centrist).
7It should be noted that classification is made on a priori ground and is never changed after the first
regression is run.
6Table 3.1: DF Test with no Structural Breaks
Variable No Trend Trend
α[k] α[k]
(t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Output growth rate -0.80*** [4] -0.98*** [4]
(4.08) (4.60)
Unemployment rate -0.13 [1] -0.17 [1]
(2.60) (2.83)
Inflation rate -0.07 [4] -0.13 [4]
(1.74) (2.37)
M1 growth rate -0.33*** [7] -0.34** [7]
(4.04) (3.93)
M2 growth rate -0.12* [5] -0.20* [5]
(2.73) (3.28)
T-bill interest rate 0.01 [0] -0.02 [0]
(0.20) (0.76)
α denotes the coefficient on the time series variable at lag 1; k denotes the lag
length. ***, **, * Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
level respectively.
Table 3.2: Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks
Variable Model Break Dates α[k] t-statistic
Unemployment rate Perron - A 1986:3 — 3.65*
Perron - A 1991:1 — 3.74*
Perron - C 1986:3 — 5.22***
Zivot & Andrews - C 1986:4 -0.38 [0] 5.56**
Lumsdaine & Papell - C 1987:1 1990:4 -0.38 [0] 6.70*
Lee & Strazicich - A 1991:2 -0.23 [3] 3.79**
Lee & Strazicich - A 1991:1 1991:3 -0.26 [0] 4.05**
Lee & Strazicich - C 1986:4 1990:3 -0.46 [0] 5.74**
Inflation rate Perron - A 1981:4 — 4.55***
Perron - C 1981:4 — 4.02**
Perron - C 1986:3 — 4.04*
Zivot & Andrews - A 1981:3 -0.30 [8] 4.72*
M2 growth rate Perron - A 1999:4 — 3.52*
Lee & Strazicich - A 2000:2 -0.15 [5] 3.27*
T-bill interest rate Perron - C 1996:1 — 4.33**
Perron - C 2001:1 — 4.64**
Zivot & Andrews - C 2001:3 -0.42 [3] 5.12**
Lumsdaine & Papell - C 1988:3 2001:3 -0.62 [3] 6.92**
Lee & Strazicich - C 2001:3 -0.33 [3] 4.72**
Lee & Strazicich - C 1988:4 2001:3 -0.50 [3] 5.75**
The “crash” model A allows for structural break(s) in the intercept of the trend function and
model C allows for structural break(s) in the intercept and slope of the trend function.
α denotes the coefficient on the time series variable at lag 1; k denotes the lag length. ***, **,
* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The appropriate
critical values for all tests are extracted from the corresponding papers.
73.1 Unit Root Analysis
This section explores the unit root properties of the Cypriot macroeconomic series un-
der consideration. Beginning with the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, we also implement the
Perron one break exogenous unit root test, the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) and Lumsdaine-
Papell (LP) endogenous DF-type unit root tests and the Lagrange multiplier (LM) unit
root tests developed by Lee & Strazicich (2003a,b). Testing the unit root hypothesis
under the presence of structural breaks entails two advantages. First, it increases the
ability to reject a unit root when the stationary alternative is true. Second, it provides
valuable information for identifying the internal or external factors that affect a Cypriot
macroeconomic variable and therefore, due to the small sample, should be taken into
account when constructing a model. Table 3.1 shows that the DF test can reject the
unit root hypothesis for the variables “output growth rate” and “M1 growth rate” at
the 1% significance level and for the variable “M2 growth level” at the 10% significance
level. However, allowing for exogenous or endogenous structural breaks the unit root
hypothesis can also be rejected for the other three series at the 10% significance level
or better (see Table 3.2)8. Having in mind that the presence of structural break(s) in
“M2 growth rate” fails to improve the significance of the t-statistic, we conclude that
the variables “output growth rate”,“M1 growth rate” and “M2 growth rate” are trend
stationary without breaks while the variables “unemployment rate”, “inflation rate”
and “t-bill rate” are trend stationary with breaks. The structural breaks in the unem-
ployment rate, as reported in Table 3.2, are closely related to the 1986 oil price crash
and the substantial declines in tourists arrivals and revenues9 caused by the Persian
Gulf War in 1991 and the crash in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism10 in 1992.
On the other hand, the structural breaks in the inflation rate occur at the end of the
second oil crisis period (1979-1981) and at the time of the 1986 oil price crash. Finally,
the structural breaks in the t-bill interest rate are associated with internal economic
changes, such as the liberalization of interest rates in 2001. In order to capture these
important structural changes, we need to include dummies in the model specification.
Since the breaks might cause several effects on the trend line of the macroeconomic
series, these dummy variables can take one of the following form:
DP (B)t =
{
0 otherwise
1 for t = B + 1 DL(B)t =
{
0 otherwise
1 for t > B
DT (B)t =
{
0 otherwise
t−B for t > B DLT (B)t =
{
0 otherwise
t for t > B
where B is the breakpoint, DP (B)t is a pulse dummy variable, DL(B)t is a level
dummy variable, DT (B)t allows for a change in the slope of the deterministic trend line
and DLT (B)t allows for a change in both the mean and the slope of the deterministic
trend line. Following the work of Christofides et al. (2006b), all the mentioned events
are analyzed and based on t-tests and goodness of fit measures (i.e. R2 and SSR),
8In all tests, we determine the optimal lag length (k) by following the general-to-specific procedure
described by Perron (1989) and suggested by Ng & Perron (1995). This involves starting with a prede-
termined upper bound kmax. If the last included lag is significant, we choose kmax. If not, we reduce
k by one until the last lag becomes significant. If no lags are significant, we set k equal to zero. As we
employ quarterly data, we set kmax equal to 4 or 8 and we use the 10% critical value of the asymptotic
normal distribution, 1.645, to assess the significance of the t-statistic on the last lag. The exogenous
structural breaks used for the Perron tests reflect the most important economic and political events that
potentially affect the Cypriot economy during the period of interest (see Table A.2.5 on page 36). The
search for structural break(s) in the four endogenous unit root tests is carried out over the time interval
[0.1T , 0.9T ] (to eliminate end-points) where T is the sample size.
9Statistical Service of Cyprus: Statistical Abstract 2005
10Pound Sterling and Italian Lira forced out the European Exchange Mechanism with direct and
unpleasant effects for Cyprus, since many citizens from Italy and especially the UK prefer Cyprus for
their vacations (Christofides et al. , 2006b).
8-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
Residual Actual Fitted
Output Growth Rate
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1.6
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Residual Actual Fitted
Unemployment Rate
-4
-2
0
2
4
0
4
8
12
16
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Residual Actual Fitted
Inflation Rate
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Residual Actual Fitted
M1 Growth Rate
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
0
5
10
15
20
25
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Residual Actual Fitted
M2 Growth Rate
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
2
3
4
5
6
7
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Residual Actual Fitted
T-Bill Rate
Figure 3.1: Cyprus Macroeconomic Series under Structural Changes
the breakpoints in the unemployment rate 1986:3 and 1991:1 are both best modeled by
DT (B)t, the breakpoints in the inflation rate 1981:4 and 1986:3 are best modeled by
DLT (B)t and DT (B)t respectively and finally the breakpoint in the t-bill rate 2001:1
is best modeled by DT (B)t.
Figure 3.1 shows the plot of the six macroeconomic series under consideration (dark
solid lines). The light solid (broken straight) lines are the estimated trend lines from
9Table 3.3: Regression Statistics for the Output Growth Rate
p = 5 p = 5 p = 5 p = 5 p = 6
q = 0 q = |4| q = |4| q = |4| q = |4|
λ = 0 λ = 0 λ = 1 λ = 1 plus X1 λ = 1 plus X1
SSR 5.45 4.27 4.45 4.46 4.52
AIC 6.30 5.82 5.77 5.48 4.45
SBC 6.49 6.04 6.05 5.78 5.78
Q(4) 3.0 (0.54) 0.0 (0.99) 1.5 (0.66) 0.5 (0.89) 0.3 (0.95)
Q(8) 18.5 (0.01) 3.4 (0.83) 5.2 (0.62) 14.8 (0.03) 6.7 (0.45)
Q(12) 21.5 (0.04) 5.7 (0.89) 10.4 (0.49) 18.0 (0.08) 9.5 (0.57)
Q∗(4) 33.4 (0.00) 23.4 (0.00) 5.5 (0.13) 3.7 (0.28) 3.9 (0.26)
Q∗(8) 42.6 (0.00) 24.0 (0.00) 7.3 (0.39) 11.7 (0.10) 10.1 (0.17)
Q∗(12) 45.9 (0.00) 24.5 (0.01) 9.0 (0.61) 15.2 (0.17) 13.5 (0.25)
SSR = sum of squared residuals; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; SBC = Schwartz
Bayesian Criterion
Q(n) reports the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the autocorrelations of the n residuals of the
estimated model. Q∗(n) reports the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the autocorrelations of the
n squared residuals of the estimated model. Significance level in parentheses.
p = lag length of autoregressive component in the mean model; q = lag length of moving-
average component in the mean model; λ = lag length of autoregressive component in the
heteroscedastic variance model; |4| denotes that only the fourth MA term is included in
the mean model; “plus Xi : ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...}” denotes that an exogenous variable is included
in the heteroscedastic variance model; X1t is the yearly rate of change of tourists arrivals.
the following regression:
zt = c+ ϑt+ ϕfDf(B)t + vzt (1)
where zt is a time series variable, c is a constant, t is a linear trend, Df(B)t : ∀f ∈
{P,L, T, LT} is the structural break(s) dummy variable(s) at time B (if any) and vzt
is the residual term. As already shown, once we allow for structural breaks to occur,
the stability condition is satisfied for all six variables. Indeed, the estimated residuals
vˆzt of the fitted models (grey spotted lines) appear to fluctuate around a mean of zero,
which implies no deviation from the long run equilibrium. However, the large volatility
of some series during particular periods suggests that we need to further analyze these
variables and, if necessary, model their condition heteroscedasticity.
3.2 Model Selection
This section applies the Box-Jenkins strategy for appropriate model selection. We be-
gin by considering plausible models for the output growth rate, denoted by yt. The
autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) of the vˆyt
sequence (i.e. the estimated residual from the regression yt = c+ ϑt+ v
y
t ) are strongly
suggestive of an AR(5) process. However, there is evidence of remaining seasonality11
in that the value of the fourth quarter for any year is substantially higher than that of
the adjacent quarters. Having estimated several seasonal models, this pattern is best
captured by the inclusion of a moving-average coefficient at lag 4. As shown in Ta-
ble 3.3, the ARMA(5, |4|) model is an improvement over the AR(5) specification - all
goodness of fit measures select the former model to the latter one while the residuals of
the ARMA(5, |4|), unlike the ones of the AR(5), do not exhibit serial correlation. On
the other hand, the volatility during the early 1990s (see Figure 3.1) suggests that we
11Even if we use seasonally adjusted data, a seasonal pattern might remain. As Enders (2003) notes,
if we do not use the entire span of data, the portion of the data used in our study can display more (or
less) seasonality than the overall span.
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Table 3.4: Selected Models Based on Statistical Adequacy Criteria
Output growth rate
yt = c+ ϑt+
∑6
j=1 αjyt−j + εt + β4εt−4
ht = κ+ ρ1ε
2
t−1 + ψX
2
1t
|∑6j=1 αˆj | < 1; |βˆ4| < 1; R2 = 0.59; Q(4) = 0.3 (0.95); Q(8) = 6.7 (0.45); Q(12) = 9.5 (0.57);
Q∗(4) = 3.9 (0.26); Q∗(8) = 10.1 (0.17); Q∗(12) = 13.5 (0.25)
Unemployment rate
ut = c+ ϑt+ ϕT1DT (86Q3)t + ϕT2DT (91Q1)t + α1ut−1 + εt
ht = κ
|αˆ1| < 1; R2 = 0.85; Q(4) = 3.8 (0.42); Q(8) = 6.5 (0.58); Q(12) = 12.6 (0.39);
Q∗(4) = 2.1 (0.71); Q∗(8) = 2.2 (0.97); Q∗(12) = 2.6 (0.99)
Inflation rate
pit = c+ ϑt+ ϕLTDLT (81Q4)t + ϕTDT (86Q3)t +
∑9
j=1 αjpit−j + εt + β4εt−4
ht = κ
|∑9j=1 αˆj | < 1; |βˆ4| < 1; R2 = 0.93; Q(4) = 0.0 (0.99); Q(8) = 2.1 (0.95); Q(12) = 4.8 (0.93);
Q∗(4) = 2.5 (0.46); Q∗(8) = 4.0 (0.77); Q∗(12) = 7.9 (0.71)
M1 growth rate
m1t = c+ ϑt+
∑3
j=1 αjm1t−j + εt + β4εt−4
ht = κ+ ρ1ε
2
t−1 + ζX
2
2t
|∑3j=1 αˆj | < 1; |βˆ4| < 1; R2 = 0.80; Q(4) = 4.3 (0.23); Q(8) = 9.0 (0.25); Q(12) = 12.0 (0.36);
Q∗(4) = 1.1 (0.77); Q∗(8) = 2.3 (0.94); Q∗(12) = 7.9 (0.72)
M2 growth rate
m2t = c+ ϑt+
∑4
j=1 αjm2t−j + εt + β4εt−4
ht = κ+ ρ1ε
2
t−1 + ζX
2
2t
|∑4j=1 αˆj | < 1; |βˆ4| < 1; R2 = 0.91; Q(4) = 1.5 (0.69); Q(8) = 11.4 (0.12); Q(12) = 11.8 (0.38);
Q∗(4) = 1.7 (0.64); Q∗(8) = 3.8 (0.81); Q∗(12) = 4.1 (0.97)
T-bill rate
ιt = c+ ϑt+ ϕTDT (01Q1)t + α1ιt−1 + εt
ht = κ+ ρ1ε
2
t−1 + ξX
2
3t
|αˆ1| < 1; R2 = 0.91; Q(4) = 1.3 (0.85); Q(8) = 2.0 (0.98); Q(12) = 5.7 (0.92);
Q∗(4) = 1.3 (0.85); Q∗(8) = 1.7 (0.98); Q∗(12) = 2.5 (0.99)
R2=coefficient of determination; Q(n) reports the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the autocorrelations of the
n residuals of the estimated model; Q∗(n) reports the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the autocorrelations of
the n squared residuals of the estimated model. Significance level in parentheses.
αj = the autoregressive coefficients in the mean model; βj = the moving-average coefficients in the mean
model; ht = the conditional variance of residual term εt; κ = constant; ρs : ∀s ∈ {1, 2, ..., λ} = the
autoregressive coefficients in the conditional variance process; X1t = the yearly rate of change of tourists
arrivals; X2t = dummy variable equal to 0 before the fourth quarter of 1999 and equal to 1 thereafter;
X3t = dummy variable equal to 0 before the first quarter of 2001 and equal to 1 thereafter; Note that
we raise Xit to the power of 2, where it is always positive, to minimize the possibility that a single, large
negative value generates a negative value for the variance.
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also need to examine the ACF and PACF of the squared residuals. The Q∗-statistics,
together with several multiplier tests for ARCH errors, confirm that there are ARCH
effects in the mean model. Diagnostic tests imply that an ARCH(1) characterizes the
error process. Since the probable cause for the volatile vˆyt during the early 1990s is the
large fluctuations in tourists arrivals and revenues (associated with the Persian Gulf
War and the crash in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism), we also consider a
modification of the ARCH(1) error structure that contains the exogenous variable X1t,
that is, the yearly rate of change of tourists arrivals. Both these ARCH specifications
remove conditional volatility (see Table 3.3) but the “ARCH(1) plus X1” process domi-
nates the pure ARCH(1) in terms of goodness of fit. On the other hand, the “ARCH(1)
plus X1” process results in residuals which are serially correlated. Adding an autore-
gressive coefficient in the mean equation is the likely solution to this problem. The
ARMA(6, |4|) model with an “ARCH(1) plus X1” process appears to be adequate - the
AIC and SBC select this specifications and also, the ACF and PACF of the residuals
and squared residuals do not indicate any serial correlation. Consequently, the most
appropriate models for the mean and the conditional variance of the output growth rate
(yt) are:
yt = c+ ϑt+
6∑
j=1
αjyt−j + εt + β4εt−4
ht = κ+ ρ1ε2t−1 + ψX
2
1t
where αj are the autoregressive coefficients in the mean equation, βj are the moving-
average coefficients in the mean equation, ht is the conditional variance of εt given ε2t−1
and X21t, κ is a constant, ρs : ∀s ∈ {1, 2, ..., λ} are the autoregressive coefficients in the
conditional variance process and ψ is the coefficient on X21t, such that κ, ρs and ψ are
always positive.
Following the same methodology, we construct the optimal models for the other five
macroeconomic series (see Table 3.4). More precisely, after detrending the data and
obtaining the residuals from the regression equation (1), we find that the estimated
residual of the unemployment rate (vˆut ) is best represented by an AR(1) model with
no ARCH effects, the estimated residual of the inflation rate (vˆpit ) by an ARMA(9, |4|)
model with no ARCH effects, the estimated residual of the M1 growth rate (vˆm1t ) by an
ARMA(3, |4|) model with an “ARCH(1) plus X2” process, the estimated residual of the
M2 growth rate (vˆm2t ) by an ARMA(4, |4|) model with an “ARCH(1) plus X2” process
and finally the estimated residual of the t-bill rate (vˆιt) by an AR(1) model with an
“ARCH(1) plus X3” process. Note that the exogenous variable X2t is a dummy variable
equal to 0 before the fourth quarter of 1999 and equal to 1 thereafter (to capture the
volatile vˆm1t and vˆ
m2
t during the post-1999 period associated with the 1999-2000 Cyprus
Stock Market crash, the liberalization of interest rates in 2001 and the liberalization
of capital movements in 2003) while the exogenous variable X3t is a dummy variable
equal to 0 before the first quarter of 2001 and equal to 1 thereafter (to capture the large
volatility of vˆιt accompanying the liberalization of interest rates in 2001). Table 3.4 also
illustrates that the selected models have all the properties of well estimated time series.
In other words, they (i) have coefficients that imply stationarity and invertibility, (ii)
fit the data well and (iii) have residuals that approximate a white-noise process.
3.3 Specification of Empirical Tests on Political Cycles
Two basic characteristics of the Cypriot economy are the smallness and openness of
the economy, with the ratio of exports and imports of goods to GDP exceeding 50%
12
(Karamanou et al. , 2001), and the partial dependence on the tourism sector, whose total
contribution12 amounted roughly to 15-20% of GDP in the period 1990-2004 (Eurostat).
These figures indicate that the world business cycle has an important impact on the
Cypriot economy and explain why political behavior in Cyprus should be examined
after controlling for the external economic environment. In light of these arguments
and building on the analysis performed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we test the various
theories of political cycles by running regressions of the following form:
zt = c+ ϑt+ ϕfDf(B)t +
p∑
j=1
αjzt−j + εt + β4εt−4︸ ︷︷ ︸
selected models as defined in Table 3.4
+γwzt + δPDUMt (2)
ht =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
κ+
λ∑
s=1
ρsε
2
t−s + ψX
2
it (3)
where PDUMt is a political dummy variable reflecting the implications of different
theories (see Table 3.5 for definitions of PDUMt and Table 3.6 for expected signs of
δ) and wzt is a proxy for the effect of the world economy. This proxy is obtained as
a weighted average of the corresponding series of Cyprus’ trading partners (IMF-IFS
data) and more precisely, the US, in an effort to capture oil price variation, the UK,
due to the importance of tourism from that country, and the group of Germany, France
and Italy, to represent the Eurozone13. The trade weights used to calculate the world
variables are the ones proposed by Karamanou et al. (2001), that is, 0.1 for the UK,
0.4 for the US and 0.5 for the Eurozone14.
Regression equation (2) assumes that there is no high linear relationship or collinear-
ity among explanatory variables. However, some of the structural breaks in the Cypriot
macroeconomic series are likely to constitute at the same time structural breaks in the
corresponding world series. In such cases, the variables Df(B)t : ∀f ∈ {P,L, T, LT}
and wzt in (2) might be highly collinear and we might face difficulties in assessing the
individual effect of each explanatory variable on zt, or its marginal contribution to R2
(Gujarati, 1992). Applying the Chow (1960) test, we find that the breakpoint 1986:3
(as modeled in Section 3.1) is also a breakpoint in the world unemployment rate and the
breakpoints 1981:4 and 1986:3 (as modeled in Section 3.1) are also breakpoints in the
world inflation rate15. To cope with this problem, we substitute wzt in the equations
of unemployment rate and inflation rate by vˆwzt (i.e. the estimated residual from the
regression wzt = c+ϑt+ϕfDf(B)t+vwzt ). This approach allows a control for the world
business cycle movement not driven by structural changes in the trend function.
12Derived from the value added and created, either directly, through the purchases of goods and
services of tourists in various sectors of economic activity or indirectly, through the intersectoral linkages.
13We choose these three countries because: (i) data for the whole sample of Eurozone countries
is readily available, (ii) they are considered to be the largest economies in the Eurozone in terms of
contribution to the total GDP (Eurostat) and (iii) they are listed among the six major trading partners
of Cyprus in the period 1990-2005 (Statistical Service of Cyprus: Statistical Abstract 2005).
14Karamanou et al. (2001) used only Germany as a representative country for the Eurozone economy.
However, after experimentation, we found that calculating the average economic outcomes of Germany,
France and Italy and using these variables to capture the Eurozone effects yields better statistical results.
15Also, regressing these world variables on a constant, a linear trend and the corresponding structural
breaks and testing the significance of the resulting R2, provides us with sufficient evidence about the
existence of multicollinearity.
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Table 3.5: Political Dummy Variables
FPTNt, SPTNt, ADMt: partisan dummy variables
PRENt, POSTNt: electoral (opportunistic) dummy variables
FPTNt =

+1 in the N quarters starting with a right government
+ 1
2
in the N quarters starting with a center-right government
− 1
2
in the N quarters starting with a center-left government
−1 in the N quarters starting with a left government
0 otherwise
SPTNt =

+1 during right governments after the first N quarters
+ 1
2
during center-right governments after the first N quarters
− 1
2
during center-left governments after the first N quarters
−1 during left governments after the first N quarters
0 otherwise
ADMt =

+1 if a right government is in office, including the quarter of the government
change
+ 1
2
if a center-right government is in office, including the quarter of the
government change
0 if a center government is in office, including the quarter of the government
change
− 1
2
if a center-left government is in office, including the quarter of the gov-
ernment change
−1 if a left government is in office, including the quarter of the government
change
PRENt =
{
+1 in the N-1 quarters preceding an election and in the election quarter
0 otherwise
POSTNt =
{
+1 in the N-1 quarters following an election and in the election quarter
0 otherwise
FPTNt and SPTNt capture the f irst part and second part transitory differences between different admin-
istrations; ADMt captures the permanent differences between different administrations; PRENt captures
the preelectoral effects; POSTNt captures the postelectoral effects.
Table 3.6: Expected Signs of Coefficients
Variable FPTNt SPTNt ADMt PRENt POSTNt
Output growth rate (−) (−)? (−) (+)
Unemployment rate (+) (+)? (+) (−)
Inflation rate (−) (+)
Money growth rates (−) (+) (−)
Interest rates (−) (−) (+)
? If the traditional partisan theory view is correct SPTNt should be statistically
significant; if the rational partisan theory view is correct SPTNt should be sta-
tistically insignificant (with or without the correct sign).
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4 Evidence on Political Cycles in Economic Outcomes
4.1 Partisan Effects on Output Growth and Unemployment Rates
We start with tests of the traditional partisan theory, which implies permanent dif-
ferences in output growth and unemployment across governments. To do so, we run
regressions using the “permanent” political dummy ADMt16. Column (1) in Table 4.1
reports the results of the output growth regression and presents evidence in favor of the
traditional partisan hypothesis: the coefficient on ADMt17 has the correct sign and is
statistically significant at the 10% confidence level. However, this result may be mis-
leading in the sense that it can be driven by strong first-part transitory effects. To
test whether the rational partisan theory view is correct we run the same regression
using the “transitory” political dummy FPTNt and its complement SPTNt. We con-
sider N = 4, 6, 8 to capture the idea that transitory output growth effects might last
between one and two years18. One important implication of this theory is that the size
of real effects depends on the degree of policy surprise. Therefore, coding each coali-
tion reshuﬄing as a surprise would overestimate the amount of uncertainty and that’s
why the political dummies FPTNt and SPTNt take into account only the government
changes occurred in elections (conditional that the new government, or coalition gov-
ernment, remains the same for at least two years). Columns (2) through (4) show the
corresponding results and confirm that the effects of government changes on output
growth are transitory rather than permanent: the coefficients on all political dummies
have the correct sign but only the FPTNt dummies are statistically significant (at the
10% confidence level or better). The pattern of estimates suggests that two years after a
change to a right (left) government, the output growth rate is about 0.7% below (above)
its long-term equilibrium value19. This estimate is about half of the one reported in
Alesina & Rosenthal (1995) and Alesina et al. (1997) for the US during the period
1947-1993 and for a group of OECD countries during the period 1960-1993. It worths
mentioning that the moving-average term in Table 4.1 is not induced by overlapping
observations. Taking as dependent variable the quarterly change of real GDP, instead
of the yearly one, and running the same regressions as before, does not change the eco-
nomic and statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on εt−4 (nor the one on
the political dummies)20.
Tests on the unemployment rate yield very similar results. Columns (1) through
(4) in Table 4.2 illustrate analogous patterns to the ones displayed in Table 4.1 for
the output growth rate21. In terms of statistical significance, all FPTNt dummies
have higher t-statistic (approximately 3.00) but in terms of economic significance, the
magnitude of the effects is substantially lower. Specifically, the estimated coefficients
imply that two years after a change to a right (left) government, the unemployment rate
16Note that changes in this dummy and election dates do not always coincide, since the government’s
partisan orientation may alter at any time after the elections (for instance, when a party pulls out of
coalition government).
17The first quarter lag in the political dummy captures the reasonable interval between the change in
regime and the change in policy.
18The choice of number of quarters is consistent with a wage contract model in which contracts have
an average length of one or two years.
19The long-term equilibrium for output growth y∗ is computed as follows:
(1−∑6j αˆj)y∗ = cˆ− δˆRPT8t ⇒ 0.64y∗ = 2.14− 1.12RPT8t ⇒ y∗ = 3.34− 1.75RPT8t
Having in mind that the partisan dummy goes to zero after eight quarters, we multiply 1.75 by 8
20
to
get the value reported in the text.
20This result also applies to the other growth rates regressions presented later in this analysis.
21Consistent results are obtained if the political dummies are lagged two quarters to capture slower
response of unemployment to policy changes.
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Table 4.1: Partisan Theories: Output Growth Rate
Dependent Variable: Output Growth Rate (y)
Method: Maximum Likelihood - ARCH (errors normally distributed)
Traditional Rational
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pre-2003
t -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 0.004 -0.02 -0.002
(1.27) (1.63) (1.79) (1.67) (0.39) (0.65) (0.19)
y(-1) 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.29***
(4.02) (3.73) (3.60) (3.50) (3.85) (3.32) (2.75)
wy 0.65** 0.66** 0.64** 0.78** 0.23 0.90** 0.91***
(2.03) (2.09) (2.09) (2.42) (0.64) (2.20) (2.89)
ADM(-1) -0.58**
(2.34)
FPT4(-1) -1.37*
(1.71)
SPT4(-1) -0.26
(0.87)
FPT6(-1) -1.06*
(1.81)
SPT6(-1) -0.22
(0.77)
FPT8(-1) -1.12** -0.74* -1.85** -2.63***
(2.34) (1.71) (2.20) (3.61)
SPT8(-1) -0.02 0.21 0.23 -0.06
(0.07) (0.55) (0.27) (0.14)
∂FPT8(-1) 5.36**
(2.28)
∂SPT8(-1) 0.88
(0.89)
X1 0.13***
(4.11)
ε(-4) -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.97***
(93.87) (93.57) (93.34) (93.38) (104.58) (71.26) (87.52)
Variance Equation
ε2(-1) 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.17
(1.14) (1.15) (1.08) (1.47) (1.17) (1.12) (1.03)
X1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.40) (1.33) (1.27) (1.21) (1.30) (1.12) (1.16)
R2 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.63
Columns report estimated coefficients (z-statistics). For brevity, constants and autoregressive coefficients
at lags 2-6 are not displayed. Equations estimated using Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors and
covariance. The no ARCH and no Serial Correlation hypotheses are accepted in all equations. X1 denotes
the yearly rate of change of tourists arrivals. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
confidence level respectively.
is about 0.2% below (above) normal. The corresponding figure for the US and a group
of OECD countries is 1.6% and 1.3% respectively22 (Alesina et al. , 1997).
As discussed in Section 3, the substantial fluctuations in tourism demand during
the early 1990s are responsible for structural changes in the unemployment rate and
volatility clustering in the output growth rate. Hence, in order to test the robustness
of the results, we add to our basic regression (with FPT8t) the variable X1t (i.e. the
growth rate of tourists arrivals). As shown in Column (5) of Table 4.1 and Table 4.2
the estimated coefficients on the partisan dummy FPT8t remain statistically significant
22Note that the average unemployment rate of Cyprus in the sample is 3.0% while, for instance, the
average unemployment rate of the US in the sample is 5.8%.
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Table 4.2: Partisan Theories: Unemployment Rate
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Rate (u)
Method: Least Squares
Traditional Rational
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pre-2003
t 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01**
(1.68) (2.00) (2.02) (2.08) (1.72) (2.13) (2.45)
DT (86Q3) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04** -0.04*** -0.04***
(2.99) (3.23) (3.31) (3.40) (2.50) (3.49) (3.80)
DT (91Q1) 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(3.60) (3.84) (4.08) (4.31) (3.02) (4.24) (4.95)
u(-1) 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.62***
(10.12) (9.82) (9.44) (8.76) (6.27) (8.00) (8.14)
vˆwu 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(4.32) (4.03) (3.97) (4.00) (3.47) (3.44) (3.61)
ADM(-1) 0.08*
(1.96)
FPT4(-1) 0.13***
(3.00)
SPT4(-1) 0.06
(1.43)
FPT6(-1) 0.13***
(3.00)
SPT6(-1) 0.06
(1.16)
FPT8(-1) 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.18** 0.18***
(3.28) (2.73) (2.35) (3.75)
SPT8(-1) 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04
(0.76) (0.43) (0.38) (0.62)
∂FPT8(-1) -0.30*
(1.69)
∂SPT8(-1) 0.18**
(2.08)
X1 -0.01*
(1.95)
R2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.88
Columns report estimated coefficients (t-statistics). Constant is not displayed. Equations estimated using
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The no ARCH and no Serial Correlation
hypotheses are accepted in all equations. X1 denotes the yearly rate of change of tourists arrivals. ***,**,*
Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
vˆwu represents the estimated residual from the regression wut = c+ ϑt+ ϕT1DT (86Q3) + v
wu
t
after controlling for this parameter23.
4.1.1 Partisan Effects over time: the impact of EMU
In preparing for EU accession and participation in the ERM II, Cyprus has, since 2001,
witnessed a stream of important structural reforms (Syrichas & Karamanou, 2004).
First, in January 2001 the statutory interest rate ceiling was abolished and all restric-
tions on medium and long-term borrowing by Cypriots were relaxed. In July 2002,
a new law came into effect which ensures the Central Bank’s independence and the
23Note that tourists arrivals and revenues are highly correlated and that the income from tourism is one
of the components of GDP. Therefore, controlling for X1t produces results that involve a tautological
element and marginally affects both the value of the coefficients and the t-statistics on the political
dummies (column (5) of Table 4.1).
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compatibility with the relevant provisions of the European Central Bank. Becoming a
member of the EU in 2004, Cyprus has also been affected by the EMU not only in terms
of experiencing a direct economic impact through economic linkages, but also in terms
of having to adjust its policies, with the ultimate goal of meeting the Maastricht crite-
ria. In other words, the new elected government (in February 2003) faced the challenge
to pursue policies being shaped by developments in Europe and not by own partisan
preferences. It is therefore quite interesting to test whether political cycles have been
mitigated in the last 4 years. Column (6) in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 presents the re-
sults of regressions similar to those in column (4), but for the pre-2003 sample period
instead of the entire sample period. The evidence suggests that the partisan manipu-
lation of the economy was more systematic before 2003: the findings for the pre-2003
sample period are stronger than the ones for the entire sample period in terms of the
economic significance of the political dummy FPT8t. To test whether this result can by
explained be reversed partisan effects in the post-2003 period, we augment the original
regression (reported in column (4)) with the interaction terms ∂FPT8t and ∂SPT8t,
capturing the transitory partisan effects in the last 4 years of our sample24. As shown
in column (7) of Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, the variable ∂FPT8t enters the regressions
highly significant and with the opposite sign, confirming our speculations. Alternative
specifications with ∂FPT4t and ∂FPT6t, and using 2001 or 2002, instead of 2003, as
the year of shift to a less partisan oriented regime, lead to the same conclusions.
4.2 Partisan Effects on Inflation Rate
We continue by applying the same tests on the inflation rate. Both partisan theories
imply permanent differences in inflation across governments and thus, we run regressions
using only the permanent political dummy ADMt25. The results for the entire sample
period, presented in column (1) of Table 4.3, provide weak evidence in favor of the
partisan theory hypothesis: although the coefficient on ADMt has the expected sign, it
is not statistically and economically significant. As discussed in the previous section, the
new elected government in 2003, although classified as center-left, had to show a great
concern for the inflationary consequences of discretionary policy-making and commit to
anti-inflation policies aspired by EMU and the Maastricht criteria. Having that in mind,
the reported insignificant results might have been driven by strongly reversed partisan
effects in the last 4 years. Indeed, when we add to the regression the interaction term
∂ADMt, the estimated coefficient on ADMt becomes statistically significant and retains
its negative sign while the one on ∂ADMt26 appears to be statistically significant and
have the opposite sign (see column (2)). Moreover, restricting the sample to include the
pre-2003 period and running the original regression, improves the results and validates,
once again, the hypothesis that, before 2003, inflation rates were higher during left
administrations. Specifically, the estimated magnitude of the effect in column (3) implies
that, the difference in the long-term equilibrium inflation rate between a left and a
right government is about 1.6%. Alesina et al. (1997) reports that the corresponding
difference in the US is 1.8% and in a group of OECD countries 1.1%. In order to test how
the convergence of the Cypriot inflation rates with those in the Eurozone has influenced
partisan differences over time, we replace the world variable vˆwpit in column (1) with
24∂FPT8t = FPT8t ∗ DL(03Q1) and ∂SPT8t = SPT8t ∗ DL(03Q1), where DL(03Q1) is a level
dummy variable for the post-2003 period.
25The third quarter lag in the political dummy captures the delay between administration change,
change in policy, and effect of policy on the inflation rate.
26∂ADMt = ADMt∗DL(03Q1), where DL(03Q1) is a level dummy variable for the post-2003 period.
18
Table 4.3: Partisan Theories: Inflation Rate
Dependent Variable: Inflation Rate (pi)
Method: Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pre-2003 pre-2001 pre-2002 pre-2003
t 0.12** 0.07 0.08 0.10* 0.08* 0.10* 0.07
(2.11) (1.39) (1.51) (1.85) (1.74) (1.99) (1.45)
DLT (81Q4) -0.08* -0.08** -0.11** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.14***
(1.88) (2.04) (2.39) (2.80) (2.81) (2.85) (2.75)
DT (86Q3) -0.03* 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05** 0.04* 0.06**
(1.84) (1.07) (1.60) (1.60) (2.19) (1.95) (2.61)
pi(-1) 0.84*** 0.79*** 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.66***
(7.93) (7.08) (6.29) (5.93) (6.06) (5.90) (5.51)
vˆwpi 0.25** 0.21** 0.20* 0.31***
(2.13) (2.00) (1.83) (2.71)
vˆepi 0.22* 0.27** 0.29**
(1.73) (2.34) (2.60)
ADM(-3) -0.02 -0.40*** -0.61*** -0.54*** -0.51*** -0.35* -0.33*
(0.17) (3.18) (3.98) (3.50) (2.72) (1.96) (1.89))
∂ADM(-3) 1.72***
(3.71)
(pi − s) 0.12**
(2.32)
ε(-4) -0.95*** -0.96*** -0.93*** -0.93*** -0.98*** -0.95*** -0.93***
(59.04) (53.29) (36.19) (30.28) (64.08) (61.68) (36.18)
R2 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95
Columns report estimated coefficients (t-statistics). For brevity, constants and autoregressive coefficients at
lags 2-9 are not displayed. Equations estimated using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
and covariance. The no ARCH and no Serial Correlation hypotheses are accepted in all equations. X1
denotes the yearly rate of change of tourists arrivals. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5 % and
10 % confidence level respectively.
vˆwpi represents the estimated residual from the regression wpit = c+ϑt+ϕLTDLT (81Q4)+ϕTDT86Q3+v
wpi
t ;
vˆepi represents the estimated residual from the regression epit = c+ϑt+ϕLTDLT (81Q4)+ϕTDT86Q3+v
epi
t
the Eurozone variable vˆepit
27 and run the same regression for the pre 2001, 2002 and
2003 periods. Columns (5) through (7) provide the results and confirm the expected
inversely proportional relationship: as the impact of the Eurozone inflation rates on the
domestic ones increases, partisan differences become less pronounced, that is, as the
coefficient value and the t-statistic on vˆepit improve over time, the coefficient value and
the t-statistic on ADMt become less significant. A similar trend is observed for the next
4 years until the partisan effects vanish completely in the fourth quarter of 2006.
A crucial issue of robustness concerns the impact of wage expansion in the infla-
tion process. Wage growth in Cyprus is associated with the backward-looking wage
indexation, which has characterized the economy since 1960 (Karamanou et al. , 2001).
The Cost of Living Allowance (CoLA system) adjusts wages semi-annually for the past
six months change in consumer prices. This further increases inflationary pressures
caused by CPI components28. To control for the latter, we add to the regression of col-
umn (3) the variable (pi− s)t representing the difference between inflation and nominal
wage growth. As shown in column (4), the significance of the partisan dummy re-
27Due to the high correlation coefficient between the Cypriot and the German inflation rates in the
last decade, we set the Eurozone variable epi equal to the inflation of Germany. However, using the
average rates of Germany, France and Italy as a proxy to the Eurozone rates leads to the same outcomes.
28In a study of inflation in Cyprus for the period 1960-1993, Kontolemis (1993) identifies as the two
most important sources of inflation imported inflation and the inflexible labor market (i.e., the fully
indexed wage system).
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Table 4.4: Opportunistic Theories: Economic Outcomes
Output growth rate
(1) Full Sample
yˆt = −0.01
(1.65)
t+ 0.34
(3.46)
yt−1 + 0.79
(2.51)
wyt + 0.27
(0.22)
PRE4t − 1.15
(2.44)
FPT8t−1 − 0.97
(91.60)
εt−4
hˆt = 0.23
(1.55)
ε2t−1 + 0.01
(1.19)
X21t R
2=0.62
(2) Pre-2003 Sample
yˆt = −0.01
(0.83)
t+ 0.39
(3.55)
yt−1 + 0.91
(2.48)
wyt + 0.95
(0.77)
PRE4t − 1.71
(1.99)
FPT8t−1 − 0.97
(74.77)
εt−4
hˆt = 0.20
(1.09)
ε2t−1 + 0.01
(1.16)
X21t R
2=0.62
Unemployment rate
(3) Full Sample
uˆt = 0.01
(1.64)
t− 0.03
(2.96)
DT (86Q3)t+0.04
(3.98)
DT (91Q1)t+0.64
(7.58)
ut−1+0.12
(4.73)
vˆwut − 0.09
(1.83)
PRE4t+0.13
(3.10)
FPT8t−1
R2=0.88
(4) Pre-2003 Sample
uˆt = 0.01
(1.80)
t− 0.04
(3.39)
DT (86Q3)t+0.04
(4.59)
DT (91Q1)t+0.62
(7.21)
ut−1+0.11
(4.15)
vˆwut − 0.10
(2.11)
PRE4t+0.14
(2.50)
FPT8t−1
R2=0.88
Inflation rate
(5) Full Sample
pit = 0.13
(2.18)
t − 0.10
(2.07)
DLT (81Q4)t − 0.03
(1.61)
DT (86Q3)t + 0.85
(7.50)
pit−1 + 0.26
(2.05)
vˆwpit + 0.20
(0.77)
POST4t −
0.06
(0.44)
ADMt−3 − 0.95
(27.91)
εt−4 R2=0.94
(6) Full Sample (with shorter-lived postelectoral effects)
pit = 0.13
(2.26)
t − 0.10
(2.12)
DLT (81Q4)t − 0.03
(1.66)
DT (86Q3)t + 0.86
(7.78)
pit−1 + 0.24
(2.14)
vˆwpit + 0.10
(1.14)
POST2t −
0.09
(0.80)
ADMt−3 − 0.95
(26.83)
εt−4 R2=0.94
(7) Pre-2003 Sample
pit = 0.09
(1.57)
t − 0.11
(2.40)
DLT (81Q4)t + 0.03
(1.31)
DT (86Q3)t + 0.73
(6.14)
pit−1 + 0.23
(1.79)
vˆwpit + 0.18
(0.66)
POST4t −
0.57
(3.30)
ADMt−3 − 0.93
(36.78)
εt−4 R2=0.95
t-statistics in parenthesis. For brevity, constants and autoregressive coefficients are not displayed. Equations
(1) and (2) estimated using Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors and covariance. Equations (3)
through (6) estimated using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The no
ARCH and no Serial Correlation hypotheses are accepted in all equations. X1t denotes the yearly rate of
change of tourists arrivals.
vˆwu represents the estimated residual from the regression wut = c+ ϑt+ ϕT1DT (86Q3) + v
wu
t
vˆwpi represents the estimated residual from the regression wpit = c+ϑt+ϕLTDLT (81Q4)+ϕTDT86Q3+v
wpi
t
mains unchanged, both statistically and economically, after controlling for this variable.
Alternative tests with lags on (pi − s)t reveal no modification of the results.
4.3 Opportunistic Effects
The “political business cycle” implies preelectoral manipulation of the economy (output
growth rates above normal and unemployment below normal) in the year or two before
an election and a postelectoral upward jump in inflation in the year or two after an
election. To test this theory we run regressions using the electoral dummies PRENt
and POSTNt for N = 4 and applying the estimation methods of the previous section.
In the case of the output growth and inflation regressions, the coefficients on the political
dummies have the expected sign (see equations (1) and (5) in Table 4.4) but they are
not statistically significant even when partisan effects are not held constant. Alternative
specifications with N = 6, 8, controlling for tourists arrivals and oil price variation, and
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restricting the sample to the pre-2003 period (see equations (2) and (7)), fail to show
any evidence on opportunistic effects in output growth and inflation. However, in the
case of the unemployment regressions (see equations (3) and (4)), the coefficients on
PRE4t are of the right sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels of
significance29. The value of the coefficient implies that one year before an election the
unemployment rate is 0.3% below its long-term equilibrium value. This effect, probably
associated with a preelectoral increase in the number of fixed term contact workers, is
relatively small and hence it is not surprising that is not accompanied by a systematic
opportunistic cycle in output growth and inflation a` la Nordhaus.
In order to test the rational opportunistic theory we run inflation regressions using
the electoral dummy POST2t because this theory implies a shorter-lived postelectoral
rise in inflation30. The estimated coefficient on POST2t (see equation (6)) is statistically
insignificant but it has a higher t-statistic than the one on POST4t. This provides
evidence, although weak, that around elections policy instruments may be manipulated
leading to short-lived effects on inflation, as implied by Rogoff & Sibert (1988) and
Rogoff (1990).
4.4 Conclusions
Section 4 investigates whether partisan and opportunistic motivations play significant
roles in the determination of economic outcomes, in a small open economy such as
Cyprus. Contrary to some belief, the empirical analysis clearly reveals the existence of
political cycles in the Cypriot economy despite its openness to international trade and
its susceptibility to external factors. Specifically, during the period 1978-2003, we find
evidence in support of the rational partisan model: growth is temporarily higher than
normal and unemployment temporarily lower than normal for about two years after
an electoral victory of the left while inflation is permanently higher when the left is in
office - relative to when the right is in office. Moreover, we find hardly any evidence
in favor of a systematic opportunistic cycle of the Nordhaus type. These results are
remarkably consistent with those obtained by Alesina et al. (1997) for the United
States and other industrial countries, even though the dimension of partisan effects
is not as large, especially in growth and unemployment. It seems that politicians in
a small open economy lack some degree of freedom in the conduct of macroeconomic
policies but eventually they manage to influence economic outcomes according to their
preferences.
Section 4 also explores whether the reported partisan effects on economic outcomes
survive inside the EU and the ERM II. It turns out that the implementation of several
structural reforms and the need to fulfill the Maastricht criteria have affected the abil-
ity of the government to manipulate the economy according to its partisan preferences.
More precisely, we find that when we take into account the last 4 years of our sam-
ple, the existing partisan differences in output growth and unemployment become less
pronounced while the ones in inflation vanish completely. The impact on each variable
seems to be associated with the degree of convergence with the corresponding variable
in the Eurozone. As Hasapis (2007) shows, there is absolute convergence in inflation
rates and exchange rates and partial convergence in other macroeconomic series.
29These results are also robust to variations in model specification.
30Note that the rational opportunistic models predict no multiyear cycle in output growth and un-
employment.
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5 Evidence on Political Cycles in Policy Instruments
5.1 Monetary Policy
We now turn to monetary policy. In the case of Cyprus, the monetary transmission
mechanism works via different channels. As Karamanou et al. (2001) point out, in-
terest rate changes affect real variables through the standard interest rate channel,
supported by the existence of sticky prices and wage rigidities, while the importance
of bank intermediated credit as a source of funds makes the credit channel significant.
Karamanou et al. (2001) also explain that capital controls and imperfect substitutabil-
ity of domestic and foreign assets along with a target zone regime create a channel for
monetary policy to affect output and prices despite a fixed exchange rate system31. It
worths noting that in 1996 the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) moved away from the use
of direct instruments for monitoring liquidity in the economy (such as minimum reserve
requirements and credit growth ceilings) in favor of market-based tools and that in the
pre-2001 period a statutory interest rate ceiling existed. In light of these facts, it is
not theoretically obvious which instrument we should include in our empirical tests and
hence, following Alesina et al. (1997), we take the approach of deriving the implications
of various political theories using several instruments. More precisely, we use the growth
rates of two monetary aggregates, one that is more closely controllable by the CBC (M1)
and a wider one (M2), and two short-term interest rates, one that is determined by the
CBC (retail bank marginal lending rate) and one that is market determined (3-month
treasury bill rate)32.
We begin with tests on the growth rates of monetary aggregates (m1 and m2) as-
suming that the monetary policy follows a rule similar to that of Taylor (1993). In other
words, we add to the basic regression equation (2) (page 12) a term for lagged inflation
(pit−4) and a term for lagged output growth gap33 (ygapt−4) to capture the idea that the
monetary policy adjusts whenever output growth gap and inflation deviate from their
respective long run equilibrium levels. Alesina (1988) and Alesina et al. (1997) estimate
an analogous reaction function for the US, using only the lagged output growth rate (or
the lagged unemployment rate) as the measure of business cycle conditions. Having in
mind that monetary policy decisions in Cyprus are also affected by the world business
cycle, we reconcile Alesina’s approach and Taylor’s rule by replacing pit−4 with wpit−4,
i.e. the lagged world inflation34. According to this specification when the divergence of
output growth from its trend value and the world inflation increase, monetary policy
becomes tighter than otherwise, because the monetary authority tries to avoid rise in
domestic inflation. Note that we use the fourth quarter lag in wpi and ygap because the
dependent variable (money growth rate) reflects changes on a yearly basis35.
31The Central Bank of Cyprus has, since 1967, pursued a stable exchange rate policy pegging the
local currency to different anchor currencies.
32Note that we could also test for the presence of political cycles in bank credit. However, a cursory
look at the yearly rate of growth of this measure reveals that it is extremely volatile in some periods
and hence we chose not to use it as a monetary policy instrument - even though by doing so we can
obtain results consistent with the partisan theory hypothesis.
33The output growth gap is calculated applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to real GDP growth rate
and subtracting the estimated trend from the real GDP growth rate.
34Including both terms in the regression equation might cause problems of multicollinearity.
35Regressing the two monetary growth rates on four lags of wpi and ygap suggests that the chosen
specification is correct since the individual effects become significant through time and the sum of
individual coefficients is negative. Specifically, in the first and second quarter there is no or small impact
while in the third and fourth quarter there are significant effects with the negative ones dominating.
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The estimated regressions in Table 5.1 show that the variable of the world business
cycle (wpit) has the expected sign and is statistically significant for both M1 and M2
while the variable of the domestic economic activity (ygapt) has the sign predicted by
the theory and is statistically significant for M1 only - probably due to the fact that M2
is not that closely controllable by the monetary authority. Columns (1) and (2) report
the results of tests on partisan theories, which imply higher monetary growth rates
under left administrations. The coefficient on the permanent partisan dummy ADMt
has the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level in the M1
equation (column (1)) and at the 1% confidence level in the M2 equation (column (2)).
The estimated values of the coefficients suggest that the long term equilibrium difference
in the monetary growth rates between a left-wing and a right-wing administration is
4.6% for M1 and 5.2% for M2. The corresponding difference in the US is approximately
4% (Alesina et al. , 1997). Two issues of robustness involve the effect of the 1999-2000
Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE) market crash36 and the impact of real interest rates on
the two monetary measures. To control for these effects, we add to the basic regressions
of columns (1) and (2) the variable set representing the yearly percentage change in the
CSE general index37 (see columns (3) and (4)) and the variable ∆rLt representing the
quarterly percentage change in real lending interest rate (see columns (5) and (6)). In
both cases, the results on the partisan dummy remain unchanged, both statistically and
economically38. In addition, following the same strategy as in the previous sections,
we restrict the sample to include the pre-2003 period and run the same regressions
(see columns (7) and (8)). Not surprisingly, the economic significance of the estimated
coefficients on ADMt is relatively higher for the pre-2003 period than that for the
entire sample period. This suggests, once again, that the monetary policy in Cyprus was
constrained in the last four years of our sample. Finally, columns (9) and (10) present the
results of tests on opportunistic theories, which imply preelectoral monetary expansion.
For both money growth measures, the coefficient on the preelectoral dummy PRE4t is
statistically insignificant. This finding seems to be invariant to tests of robustness such
as excluding the partisan dummy ADMt as a regressor, using alternative specifications
with PRE2t, PRE6t or PRE8t, and running the same regressions for the pre-2003
period (see columns (11) and (12)).
We continue with tests on short-term interests rates (iLt and i
TB
t ). As in the case of
the monetary growth reaction functions, we have included in the interest rate equations
lagged values of the variables ygapt and wpit to control for the impact of the domestic
and world economy on monetary policy adjustments. However, such measures turned
out to be statistically insignificant and hence they are not taken into account for these
tests. The problem here lies mostly with the small variation exhibited since the nominal
interest rates were relatively fixed throughout each year until the start of the financial
liberalization process in 199639. Having that in mind, one has to be very cautious in
36Spurred by tax incentives, a wave of mergers and initial public offerings, and bank lending for
equity purchases, as well as the existence of market abuses that highlighted regulatory and supervisory
gaps, the CSE grew eight-fold in the space of less than one year, peaking in November 1999 and then
collapsing below its original level over the next two years (Stephanou & Vittas, 2007).
37The official Cyprus Stock Exchange was launched by the Cypriot government in March 1996. There-
fore, set takes value 0 in the pre-1996 period.
38Including a variable for the world average money growth as a regressor does not change the results
either.
39Since 1996, most government securities (including the 3-month treasury bills) have been issued
through auctions, allowing interest rates to reflect prevailing market conditions. On the other hand, re-
tail bank interest were determined, from time to time, by the CBC until the Interest Rate Liberalization
Law came into force in 2001, providing the abolition of the interest rate ceiling. Following interest rate
liberalization, banks adopted a base lending rate as the reference rate, to which a margin was added
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Table 5.2: Partisan Theories: Nominal Interest Rates
Dependent Variable: Nominal Lending Rate (iL) (columns (1), (3));
Nomimal T-Bill Rate (iTB) (columns (2), (4))
Method: Maximum Likelihood - ARCH (errors normally distributed)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-1996
t -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.003 0.004
(6.80) (3.90) (0.63) (0.42)
DT (01Q1) -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.07***
(2.73) (3.11) (2.40) (3.12)
iL(-1) 1.22*** 1.04***
(13.95) (5.23)
iTB(-1) 0.83*** 0.77***
(4.16) (9.64)
wiL 0.001*** 0.06**
(6.87) (2.53)
wiTB 0.004*** 0.11**
(3.87) (2.32)
ADM(-2) -0.04*** -0.01*** -0.19** -0.22*
(6.84) (3.33) (1.98) (1.84)
Variance Equation
ε2(-1) 1.98*** 9.65** 0.16 0.04
(2.64) (2.19) (0.77) (0.17)
X3 0.05 0.19 0.03*** 0.06
(1.57) (1.09) (2.64) (1.24)
R2 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.90
Columns report estimated coefficients (z-statistics). For brevity, constants
and autoregressive coefficients at lags 2-3 are not displayed. Equations esti-
mated using Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors and covariance. The
no ARCH and no Serial Correlation hypotheses are accepted in all equations.
X3 is a dummy variable equal to 0 before the first quarter of 2001 and equal
to 1 thereafter. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
confidence level respectively.
estimating political cycle effects based on the full sample period and that’s why our
empirical analysis on interest rates focuses mainly on the 1996-2006 sample, where
there is a larger variability in interest rates. The world variable that we chose to use in
these regressions is, like in the case of economic outcomes, a world average of the same
variable, i.e. the world lending rates (wiLt ) and the world treasury-bill rates (wi
TB
t ).
Table 5.2 reports the results of partisan theory tests on nominal interests rates. If
monetary policy is systematically more expansionary during left administrations, we
expect higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates during these administra-
tions than during right ones (a Fisherian effect). Although the findings in columns (1)
and (2) provide evidence in favor of this hypothesis (the coefficients on ADMt are neg-
ative and statistically significant), the estimated size effects are close to zero. However,
when we consider the shorter sample period 1996-2006 the results become economically
more significant. Specifically, the values of the estimated coefficients in columns (3) and
(4) imply a difference in the long-run equilibrium interest rate between a left and a right
administration of about 0.5% for both measures. It worths noting that since interest
rates are procyclical and the output growth is higher under left administrations, the in-
terest rate differential is expected to be higher than the inflation differential. This latter
according to the risk and creditworthiness of the client. As an additional measure, the base rate of
banks was set equal to the marginal lending rate, so that changes in the official interest rates by the
CBC could be passed on effectively to market rates.
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observation may justify the success to find significant partisan differences in nominal
interest rates during the 1996-2006 period when the inflation partisan differences were
found to be insignificant (and possibly reversed) during the post-2003 period.
An important issue, associated with political effects in monetary policy, is the in-
dependency of central banks. One might cite that semi-independent (or independent)
central banks can reduce (or eliminate) politically influenced fluctuations in growth
and inflation because partisan politicians do not control monetary policy. However, as
Alesina et al. (1997) point out, governments can have an indirect influence on monetary
policy through several channels, such as the presence of government representatives on
central bank’s boards or the executive’s power to appoint the central bank’s governor40.
In addition, monetary authorities cannot be totally detached and impenetrable to so-
ciety’s preferences and government’s desires41. On the other hand, we cannot expect
to commit monetary policy if fiscal policy cannot be precommited at the same time.
Beetsma (1999) shows that excessive deficits may induce the Central Bank to adopt a
more inflationary stance than otherwise while Hughes Hallett (2008) finds that, despite
the rhetoric, central banks do not attempt to punish or discipline fiscally expansive
governments. All these arguments provide an explanation why partisan conflicts on
the inflation-unemployment trade-off are still present in Cyprus, even in the context of
increased central bank independence and financial integration.
5.2 Fiscal Policy
In this section, we examine the effects of elections and partisan politics on fiscal policy.
Concerning partisan models, it is not theoretically obvious whether budget deficits are
larger under left-wing or right wing administrations. The relevant empirical literature
is also controversial. A number of studies support the conventional wisdom that more
leftish governments have a tendency to run larger budgets, while several other researches
find exactly the opposite effects or no effects at all42. Concerning opportunistic models,
the theory implies higher budget deficits before elections based on the idea that lower
taxes and higher spending might increase votes for the incumbent party. However, most
empirical studies focusing on industrial countries find little support for such election-
driven fiscal policy manipulations. The empirical evidence for member countries of the
EU is also weak (see De Haan & Sturm, 1994; Andrikopoulos et al. , 2004). On the other
hand, a number of studies concentrating on the old member countries of the EU (see
von Hagen, 2003; Buti & van den Noord, 2003) argue that in more recent years fiscal
policy often turned expansionary before elections. Given these mixed results, it is of
great interest to investigate the same questions in the case of Cyprus. The analysis uses
annual time series data and, hence, the political dummies ADMt, PREt are redefined
to capture partisan and electoral differences on a yearly basis43.
We begin by considering real budget deficits, measured by the yearly change in the
government public debt (as a share of GDP) ( ∆btGDPt ). Following the econometric proce-
dure described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the data were subject to DF tests and diagnostic
checks of model adequacy, providing evidence that the variable ∆btGDPt is trend stationary
40The Cyprus Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) comprises the Governor and five other members,
three of whom are appointed by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Minister of
Finance. The Governor is appointed by the President for a 5 years term (renewable).
41Syrichas & Karamanou (2004) stress that without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the
Central Bank of Cyprus supports the general economic policy of the government.
42For an extensive overview of the corresponding empirical literature see Liargovas & Manolas (2007).
43Since the presidential elections in Cyprus occur in the first quarter of year t, the preelectoral dummy
PREt takes on value 1 in the preelectoral year (t− 1).
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(without breaks) and that one annual lag is sufficient to capture its autoregressive com-
ponent. In order to control for the standard economic determinants of budget deficits,
we use the tax-smoothing model of Barro (1986)44. Hence, the estimated equation,
which embodies partisan and opportunistic hypotheses, is written as follows:
∆bt
GDPt
= a0+ a1t+ a2
∆bt−1
GDPt−1 + a3
piet bt−1
GDPt
+ a4UV ARt+ a5GV ARt+ a6PDUMt+ et (4)
where t is a linear trend, piet is the expected rate of inflation, UV ARt is a measure for
cyclical fluctuations computed as (ut − u∗t )( g
∗
t
GDPt
), where ut is the unemployment rate,
gt is the government spending and the asterisk denotes long-run components derived
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, GV ARt is a measure for transitory spending shocks
computed as (gt−g
∗
t )
GDPt
, PDUMt is a political dummy variable reflecting the implications
of different theories and et is an error term. According to this model, budget deficits
emerge during recessions and are higher when spending is temporarily high. Thus, the
coefficients on UV ARt and GV ARt are expected to be positive. Similarly, the coefficient
on pi
e
t bt−1
GDPt
should be positive, since there is a tendency to adjust the nominal debt in
order to compensate expected inflation. As in Barro (1986), we obtain a measure for
the expected inflation by estimating a system of two equations, one for deficits and
one for inflation. Expected inflation is generated as a forecasting relation using two
annual lags of inflation, pit−1 and pit−2, and one annual lag of monetary growth (based
on annual averages of M2), m2t−1. Before studying partisan and electoral effects on
fiscal deficits we must also control for differences in government structure and budget
voting procedures (see Roubini & Sachs, 1989). To do so, we add to the above model
the variable POLVt representing the degree of government fragmentation45 multiplied
by the fraction of legislators (members of the Cyprus House of Representatives) who
vote against the approval of the proposed annual budget46. We expect the coefficient
on POLVt to be positive since a higher degree of disagreement over the budget (during
periods with different parties in control of the executive and legislative branch), delays
fiscal adjustment to external shocks and as a result, government debt accumulates more
rapidly and to a larger extent.
Table 5.3 presents the corresponding results estimated using iterative weighted least
squares47. As in the previous sections, the system is estimated separately for the periods
1978-2006 and 1978-2003, in order to test for the impact of the fiscal consolidation as-
sociated with the Maastricht criteria for EMU membership. Columns (1) and (2) show
the results when we introduce the partisan dummy ADMt. Starting with the economic
variables, we observe that (i) about one quarter of the lagged budget persists in the
following year (the coefficient on ∆bt−1GDPt−1 ), (ii) expected inflation does not seem to affect
the real value of debt (the coefficient on pi
e
t bt−1
GDPt
is both economically and statistically
insignificant), (iii) budget deficits are countercyclical (the coefficient on UV ARt is posi-
tive and statistically significant in the 1978-2003 regression) and (iv) transitory spending
shocks tend to increase real budget deficits (the coefficient on GV ARt is positive and
44The definition of variables is similar to Barro (1986) and, therefore, differs somewhat from Alesina
et al. (1997).
45Government fragmentation, as defined in Roubini & Sachs (1989), is captured by a dummy variable
that takes value 0 when the parties members of the coalition hold the majority in the legislature and 1
when they do not hold the majority in the legislature.
46The data were retrieved from the library of the Cyprus House of Representatives.
47It should be noted that if we set the expected rate of inflation (piet ) equal to the growth rate of
nominal wages or the actual rate of inflation of the previous year and estimate the deficit equation by
ordinary least squares, we obtain similar estimated coefficients and standard errors. Thus, our results
are not driven by the use of an embedded estimator in the construction of piet .
27
Table 5.3: Political Cycles Theories: Budget Deficits
Dependent Variable: Real Budget Deficit ( ∆b
GDP
)
Method: Iterative Weighted Least Squares
Partisan Theories Opportunistic Theories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre-2003 pre-2003
t -0.10** 0.002 -0.10** 0.002
(2.19) (0.06) (2.19) (0.06)
∆b
GDP
(-1) 0.26 0.20 0.26 0.20
(1.49) (1.25) (1.48) (1.24)
pieb(−1)
GDP
-0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007
(0.64) (1.20) (0.66) (1.20)
UV AR 3.00 4.10* 3.05 4.11*
(1.04) (1.87) (1.05) (1.87)
GV AR 1.15*** 1.21*** 1.15*** 1.21***
(3.68) (5.08) (3.67) (5.06)
POLV 4.20* 3.05* 4.05* 3.01*
(1.90) (1.80) (1.78) (1.73)
ADM 0.08 -0.71 0.07 -0.71
(0.14) (1.55) (0.12) (1.55)
PRE 0.22 0.06
(0.26) (0.09)
R2 0.55 0.65 0.55 0.65
Dependent Variable: Inflation (pi)
pi(-1) 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 0.77***
(4.56) (4.41) (4.56) (4.41)
pi(-2) -0.21 -0.25 -0.21 -0.25
(1.29) (1.44) (1.29) (1.44)
m2(-1) 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.28***
(2.73) (2.50) (2.73) (2.50)
R2 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
Columns report estimated coefficients (t-statistics). For brevity, constants
are not displayed. The no Serial Correlation hypotheses are accepted in all
equations. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
level respectively.
statistically significant). Concerning the political variable POLVt, we note that the
estimated coefficient has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant, sug-
gesting that government fragmentation in relation with budget approval procedures are
responsible for larger budget deficits. Turning, finally, to the partisan variable ADMt,
we can see that in the full sample regression (column (1)) the estimated coefficient is
positive and statistically insignificant but when we restrict the sample to include the
pre-2003 period (column (2)) the estimated coefficient becomes negative and is now very
close of being statistically significant, implying that left wing administrations are more
deficit-prone than right-wing administrations. Economically, the estimated coefficient
on ADMt implies that the difference in the long run equilibrium budget deficit between
a left and a right government is nearly 1%. The latter results indicate that partisan-
ship used to affect budget deficits but the implementation of the Maastricht criteria
has eliminated its impact. Columns (3) and (4) show the results when we introduce
in columns (1) and (2) the preelectoral dummy PREt. In both regressions the sign of
the estimated coefficient is the expected one (deficits are higher in the year before the
elections) but the effect is statistically insignificant. These findings seem to persist when
partisan effects are not held constant.
The failure to obtain an electoral cycle in the overall budget deficits does not neces-
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Table 5.4: Political Cycles Theories: Fiscal Balance Subcomponents
Dependent Variable: First Difference of Transfer Payments over GDP (∆trgt
GDPt
) (columns (1)-(4)),
First Difference of Direct Taxes over GDP (∆dtxt
GDPt
) (columns (5)-(8))
Method: Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
pre-2003 pre-2003
t 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03* -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04**
(2.25) (2.21) (2.13) (2.06) (0.55) (0.87) (1.48) (2.55)
∆trg
GDP
(-1) 0.51** 0.47* 0.66* 0.61
(2.09) (1.85) (1.75) (1.50)
∆dtx
GDP
(-1) 0.14 0.04 -0.004 -0.09
(0.51) (0.19) (0.01) (0.55)
∆y -0.01 -0.01 0.07** 0.07**
(0.38) (0.44) (2.16) (2.58)
∆u 0.09 0.06 -0.82*** -0.82***
(0.65) (0.39) (5.12) (6.17)
ADM -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 -0.14 0.08 0.18 0.25 0.38***
(0.55) (0.67) (0.95) (0.96) (0.44) (1.23) (1.20) (3.15)
PRE 0.33* 0.33** 0.32* 0.30* -0.57** -0.60** -0.59** -0.60***
(1.98) (2.25) (1.92) (2.02) (2.16) (2.46) (2.67) (3.22)
R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.20 0.43 0.36 0.64
Columns report estimated coefficients (t-statistics). For brevity, constants are not displayed. Equations
estimated using White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The no ARCH and
no Serial Correlation hypotheses are accepted in all equations. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the
1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
sarily mean that elections do not affect fiscal policy. More visible and politically sensitive
instruments may be more easily and productively manipulated than others (see Rogoff,
1990) and, therefore, one should also try to find possible electoral effects in subcom-
ponents of government spending and revenues. Having that in mind, we continue our
analysis with tests on transfer payments and direct taxes48. We take as dependent vari-
ables the yearly changes in transfer payments and direct taxes over GDP, denoted by
∆trgt
GDPt
and ∆dtxtGDPt respectively. At a first stage, we examine the unit root properties of the
series and perform diagnostic checks of model adequacy to obtain the most appropri-
ate model for each variable. We find evidence that both dependent variables are trend
stationary (without breaks) and that the best autoregressive specification is an AR(1).
In order to control for the impact of business cycle, we add to the chosen models two
alternative measures: the yearly change in the unemployment rate (∆ut) and the yearly
change in the real GDP growth (∆yt). Transfer payments are expected to increase when
there is a growth slowdown and when unemployment goes up while direct taxes should
follow exactly the opposite direction. Table 5.4 displays the results of these regressions
when we include the partisan dummy ADMt and the preelectoral dummy PREt among
the regressors. Specifically, Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) present the results for the en-
tire sample period while columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) the results for the pre-2003 sample
period. The dependent variables appear to be procyclical (the coefficients on ∆yt and
∆ut have the expected signs) but the effects are statistically significant only in the di-
rect taxes regressions. The estimates on ADMt provide evidence, although statistically
weak, that transfer payments are higher and direct taxes are lower during left-wing
administrations. In addition, the statistical significance of ADMt in column (8) implies
that the partisan cycle found in Table 5.3 for the pre-2003 period derives from reduced
taxes during left governments. Finally, the results on the electoral dummies confirm the
48These two measures tend to be more easily controlled in election years.
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speculation that when we focus on compositional effects, electoral cycles in fiscal policy
become feasible: the estimated coefficients on PREt have the expected signs (transfer
payments are higher before elections and direct taxes are lower before elections) and all
of them are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. Repeating the
same analysis on other subcomponents of the fiscal balance produces some interesting
results, as well. In particular, we find that governments tend to increase indirect taxes
at the beginning of their term so as to be able to reduce direct taxes at the end of their
term when they face elections. Moreover, we find that the administration in power tries
to balance the increased preelectoral government spending, caused by higher transfer
payments, by reducing expenditures on investment projects49.
5.3 Conclusions
Section 5 follows the same empirical analysis as in Section 4 to examine the presence of
political cycles in macroeconomic policy instruments in the case of Cyprus. The findings
support, once again, the partisan theories and match those found in the previous sec-
tion for economic outcomes. In particular, the evidence, during the period 1978-2003, is
consistent with the view that (i) left wing governments follow more expansionary mone-
tary policies than right wing governments (monetary growth aggregates and, to a lesser
extent nominal interest rates, are systematically higher during left administrations) and
(ii) left wing governments tend to be more deficit-prone than right wing governments
(fiscal deficits are relatively higher during left administrations). Concerning opportunis-
tic manipulation of policy instruments, we find strong evidence of an electoral cycle in
subcomponents of the fiscal balance: transfer payments are higher and direct taxes are
lower close to election quarters. The latter results, together with those on inflation in
Section 4.3, support the rational opportunistic models of Rogoff & Sibert (1988) and
Rogoff (1990). It should be noted that the corresponding tests performed by Alesina
et al. (1997) on data from other countries do not provide similar results in all cases.
Specifically, Alesina et al. (1997) find supportive evidence of electoral cycles in mone-
tary policy instruments in a large set of OECD countries and no evidence of preelectoral
manipulation of fiscal policy in the United States. The diversity of results is probably
driven by the fact that different countries use different combination of instruments to
achieve their political goals and this combination may change over time. For instance,
in the case of Cyprus, the small variation exhibited in the nominal interest rates before
1996, induced governments to use alternative policy instruments to generate politically-
motivated economic outcomes, i.e. targeting monetary aggregates or turning to fiscal
policy instruments. The empirical analysis of Section 5 also confirms the findings about
the change of the direction of partisan effects in the post-2003 period. In other words,
it supports the argument that the implementation of structural reforms and the strict
provisions of the Maastricht criteria allow limited national policy autonomy.
6 Discussion
Why do partisan cycles appear in Cyprus? As we have already seen, govern-
ments’ ideological preferences influence the economic performance in Cyprus, despite
the smallness and openness of its economy. However, the presence of partisan effects
in Cyprus, especially during the pre-2003 period, is also striking for another reason. It
contradicts the argument of Alesina et al. (1997) that such effects are not easily identifi-
able in countries where the broad-based coalitions are the rule or where the government
49This is consistent with the rational opportunistic model of Rogoff (1990).
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has no full control of executive and legislative powers (as in the case of Cyprus). These
observations, together with the lack of similar evidence in a number of EU countries50,
raises the following question: what are the special characteristics of the political envi-
ronment and economy of Cyprus that make the partisan model (and its rational version)
empirically successful against all predictions? Although there is no clear answer, some
speculations can definitely be made. First, the larger gap in economic ideology between
the left and the right party, compared to the one of other countries51, may cause sharper
conflicts about the distribution of income and wealth. Second, the electoral system that
allows the formation of coalitions a few days before the elections52, can increase the
degree of surprise in the electoral result and lead to a larger postelectoral economic
impact53. Third, the wage indexation, which characterizes the economy since 1960, can
reduce the impact of inflation uncertainty on the real sector in the long-run (see Holland,
1986), and support the assumption of rationality incorporated in the model. Overall, we
conclude that a clear partisan cycle emerges in economies with particular characteristics
and no generalizations can be made without taking into account all possible aspects of
a country’s partisan structure, electoral system, institutional design and so on. That’s
why analogous studies on large multicountry samples and for long time periods run the
risk of producing misleading results if not carefully consider all these parameters.
Will politics matter for macroeconomic policies in the future? Alesina et al.
(1997) predict that in the near future partisan conflicts on the inflation-unemployment
trade-off will not disappear, even in the context of a monetary union, while partisan
and distributional conflicts over fiscal decisions are likely to become sharper. The find-
ings of this study call into question the above arguments since they imply that politics
become less important for economic policy as the degree of economic integration with
EMU members increases, at least in the case of Cyprus (i.e. partisan differences in
inflation and fiscal deficits vanish completely when we consider the entire sample pe-
riod). However, this result does not necessarily mean that this pattern will continue
forever. It is likely that the structural change observed in the direction (and size) of
partisan effects coincides with a short period of distinct convergence with the Euro-
zone standards, and that in the future partisan governments will continue generating
economic fluctuations around a new equilibrium. On the other hand, we can not rule
out the possibility that the strong partisan ideologies of the past will begin converging,
especially inside the EMU, and eventually political parties will become alike in terms
of macroeconomic management (to avoid the costs of economic destabilization). Under
this scenario two things can happen. First, political cycles will be limited to electoral
50Alesina & Roubini (1992) find evidence in favor of the rational partisan model for a sample of
eighteen OECD countries, including eleven members of the EU, but the corresponding evidence for
many subsamples (i.e. specific countries) is not that overwhelming.
51In most countries the “left” is associated with various models of socialism while in Cyprus the “left”
is associated with communism (and socialism moves to the center of the political spectrum). It should
be noted that in principle, the left party in Cyprus (AKEL) opposes privatization and liberalization,
but in practice, it tolerates the economic policy implications that come with EU membership.
52A candidate to be elected as a president needs more than 50% of the votes validly cast. If none
of the candidates attains the required majority, the election is repeated on the corresponding day of
the following week between the two candidates who received the greater number of votes. During that
week, coalitions can be formed between the defeated candidates of the first round (and their parties)
and the winning candidates (and their parties).
53One of the rational theory’s implications is that the size of the postelectoral real effect of monetary
and fiscal policies depends on the degree of electoral surprise.
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budget cycles54 or focus on opportunistic manipulation of fiscal policy instruments a`
la Rogoff (1990). That is, governments will choose policies that are easy to employ in
the short-run and with little effects on the aggregate economy (i.e. shifting spending to
more visible programs that may favor key constituencies). Second, politicians will try to
maximize their chances of electoral victory by growing party differentiation on the basis
of different positions regarding pure political issues, rather than economic ideologies55.
These points, of course, require a more detailed treatment and would be an interesting
topic for future research, for both economists and political analysts.
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54The empirical evidence on the initial years of EMU supports the existence of a political budget
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A Appendix
A.1 Econometric Theory
A.1.1 Unit Root Tests
The assumptions of the classical regression model necessitate that the series be station-
ary and that the errors have zero mean and a finite variance (Enders, 2003). In the
presence of nonstationary variables, there might be what Granger & Newbold (1974) call
a spurious regression. A spurious regression has a high R2 and t-statistics that appear
significant, but the results are without any economic meaning. Therefore, pretesting
the variables in a regression for nonstationarity is extremely important. Dickey & Fuller
(1979, 1981) (to be referred to as DF) provide the appropriate test statistics to deter-
mine whether a series contains a unit root (is integrated of order one) and hence it
appears to be nonstationary. One major drawback of the DF unit root tests is that
they overlook the occurrence of structural changes56. Perron (1989) argues that the
presence of structural breaks will bias the tests towards the non rejection of a unit root
and proposes a modified DF test that includes dummy variables to allow for one known,
or exogenous, structural break. Subsequent papers use a variety of sequential tests al-
lowing for unknown breakpoints that are determined endogenously from the data. Zivot
& Andrews (1992) (to be referred to as ZA) select the breakpoint where the t-statistic
testing the unit root hypothesis is the most negative while Lumsdaine & Papell (1997)
(to be referred to as LP) extent the ZA model to accommodate two structural breaks.
A limitation on these two tests is that the critical values are derived while assuming
no breaks under the null hypothesis leading to size distortions and spurious rejections.
To address this issue Lee & Strazicich (2003a) propose an one-break Lagrange multi-
plier (LM) unit root test as an alternative to the ZA test and Lee & Strazicich (2003b)
suggest a two-break LM unit root test as an alternative to the LP test.
A.1.2 Box-Jenkins modeling procedure and ARCH techniques
Box & Jenkins (1976) popularized a three-stage method aimed at selecting an appropri-
ate model for estimating a univariate time series. In the identification stage, we examine
the time plot of the series, the autocorrelation function and the partial correlation func-
tion to decide which autoregressive moving-average components should be used in the
model. Note that a comparison of the sample ACF and PACF to those of various theo-
retical ARMA processes may suggest several plausible models. In the estimation stage,
we estimate each of the alternative models by OLS, examine the various coefficients
and compare the estimated models using the criteria of parsimony and goodness of fit.
Finally, in the diagnostic checking stage, we test whether the selected model conforms to
the specifications of a stationary univariate process. In particular, the residuals should
be independent from each other and constant in mean and variance over time.
Many economic time series exhibit phases of relative tranquility followed by periods
of high volatility (and vice versa). In such circumstances the homoscedasticity assump-
tion is inappropriate57 and therefore we need to extend Box-Jenkins methodology to
include ARCH effects in the regression framework. To do so, we examine the ACF and
56A structural change (or break) appears when there is an unexpected shift in the mean or the slope
of the deterministic trend line (or both) of a (macroeconomic) time series. This may be due to external
forces, internal political and economic changes or other factors.
57Note that for series exhibiting volatility, the unconditional (or long-run) variance may be constant
even though the variance during some periods is unusually large.
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PACF of the squared residuals, identify the order of the ARCH58 process and estimate
the mean equation and the selected ARCH process simultaneously by maximum like-
lihood techniques. The estimated models should provide a good fit and the residuals
should be serially uncorrelated and not display any remaining conditional volatility. If
the estimation is inadequate, we have to return to step one and attempt to build a
better model.
58The key feature of an ARCH(λ) model is that the conditional variance constitutes an autoregressive
process of order λ, or alternatively, depends on past λ realizations of the error process. The basic model
can be extended in a number of different ways. For instance, we can include explanatory variables in
the equation for the conditional variance.
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A.2 Tables
Table A.2.1: Empirical Implications of Opportunistic Models
Traditional models Rational models
Regular multiyear cycle in growth and
unemployment: growth is above nor-
mal (unemployment below normal) in the
year or two before an election; growth
falls (unemployment increases) after the
election.
No regular multiyear cycle in growth and
in unemployment.
Monetary and fiscal policies are expan-
sionary in the year or two before the elec-
tion and contractionary in the year or two
after the election.
Monetary and fiscal policies are expan-
sionary two to three quarters preceding
an election and contractionary two to
three quarters after the election; smaller
and shorter-lived effects than in the tra-
ditional model.
Inflation begins to increase immediately
before an election, continues to increase
for a few quarters after the election, then
falls.
Same as for the traditional model, but
smaller and shorter-lived effects on infla-
tion.
Source: Alesina et al. (1997)
Table A.2.2: Empirical Implications of Partisan Models
Traditional models Rational models
Growth permanently higher, unemploy-
ment permanently lower when the left is
in office.
Growth is temporarily higher, unemploy-
ment temporarily lower than the natural
rate after a left-wing election victory; the
opposite is true after a right-wing elec-
toral victory.
Deviation of growth and unemployment
from natural rates is correlated with the
amount of electoral surprise.
Unemployment and growth return to
their natural rates in the second part of
both right and left-wing terms of office.
Inflation permanently higher when the
left is in office.
Inflation permanently higher when the
left is in office.
Source: Alesina et al. (1997)
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Table A.2.3: Cyprus Economic Data
Quarterly Data Sample Source
Gross Domestic Product, s.a 1981:4-2006:4 Economics Research Center
Central Bank of Cyprus
Registered Unemployment Rate (total), s.a 1978:1-2006:4 Statistical Service of Cyprus
Central Bank of Cyprus
Consumer Price Index, s.a 1978:1-2006:4 Eurostat
Monetary Supply M1, s.a 1978:1-2006:4 Eurostat
Monetary Supply M2, s.a 1978:1-2006:4 Eurostat
3-month Treasury Bill Rate 1978:1-2006:4 IMF-IFS
Retail Bank Marginal Lending Rate 1978:1-2006:4 IMF-IFS
Tourists Arrivals, s.a 1978:1-2006:4 Statistical Service of Cyprus
Cyprus Stock Exchange General Index, s.a. 1996:1-2005:4 Eurostat
Bank Credit, s.a 1978:1-2006:4 IMF-IFS
Yearly Data Sample Source
Government’s Public Debt 1978-2006 Ministry of Finance
Components of Fiscal Balance 1978-2006 Ministry of Finance
s.a = seasonally adjusted using the X12 ARIMA method of the US Census Bureau
Table A.2.4: Cyprus Political Data
1978:1 E C DIKO (centrist) holds the presidency
1983:1 E CL DIKO† (centrist) and AKEL (left) form coalition government
1984:4 C AKEL (left) pulls out of coalition government
1988:1 E L Independent president with left background - nominated and supported
by AKEL (left)
1993:1 E CR DISY† (right) and DIKO (centrist) form coalition government
1997:4 R DIKO (centrist) pulls out of coalition government
1998:1 E CR DISY† (right) and EDEK (centrist) form coalition government
1999:1 R EDEK (centrist) pulls out of coalition government
2003:1 E CL DIKO† (centrist), EDEK (centrist) and AKEL (left) form coalition
government
Exogenous timing of presidential elections: 5 years
E = presidential election; R = right government; CR = center-right government;
L = left government; CL = center-left government; C = center government
† holds the presidency
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Table A.2.5: Important Economic and Political Events (1978-2006)
Date Event Description
1979:1-1981:4 Second oil crisis period
1985:4-1986:3 Oil price crash
1987:4 A protocol for the second stage of the Association Agreement with the
European community was signed
1990:3-1991:1 The Persian Gulf War
1992:2 The Cyprus pound was linked to the European Currency Union (ECU)
1992:3 The British pound and the Italian lira left the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism
1996:1 The Central Bank of Cyprus introduced a new framework of monetary
policy implementation
1999:1-1999:2 The Kosovo War
1999:1 Replacement of the ECU by the Euro
1999:4-2000:1 Cyprus Stock Market Crash
2000:3 The Cyprus government introduced a new way of calculating the oil prices
2001:1 Liberalization of the interest rates
2001:3 Terrorist attack on the United States
2003:1 The Iraq War
2004:2 Cyprus became a full member of the European Union
2005:2 The Cyprus pound joined the European Exchange Mechanism (ERM-II)
Source: Christofides et al. (2006a)
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